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"' sc.vs5 i/L No. 76-835 
µ ~~ UNITED STATES 
~~,fr v. 
Cert to CA 2 (Medina, 
Feinberg; Mansfield diss.) 
Federal/Civil Timely i;~: NEW YORK TELEPHONE CO. 
~~ir!.· This cert petition was placed on List 3 because the SG requested 
~~ consideration of the petition before the term recess in order th?t, if 
.J., ~l granted, the case could be argued this te m. 
(Yl.00~ · CA 2 held that while district courts may have the inherent 
lS t:J.- authority to order a telephone company to assist government agents in 
~ ~lacing a pen register surveillance device on the telephone lines of 
criminal suspects, to do so in the absence of express statutory authori-




FACTS: A pen register is a mechanical instrument attached to a telephone 
line which records the outgoing numbers di~d on a particular telephone. 
The device is not used to learn or monitor the contents of a call. 
Resp notes, however, that notwithstanding the apparent sterility of a 
pen register, a full wiretap interception may be accomplished simply 
by attaching headphones or a taperecorder to the appropriate terminal 
on the pen register unit. 
In March, 1976, FBI agents sought and received from SD NY 
(Tenney) an order authorizing them to install a pen register upon 
.... ~ ~- --._ -----
specified telephones, based on his finding that there was probable 
cause to believe that the telephones were being used in the commission 
of federal garnbl~ng offenses. As part of the order, resp was directed 
to furnish the agents "all information, facilities and technical 
assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively", 
with compensation to be paid the company at the prevailing rates. 
Resp furnished some assistance, but declined to furnish telephone lease 
or private lines without which FBI agents determined a successful 
interception could not be implemented. Resp moved SD NY to vacate 
its order directing the company to furnish facilities and assistanc~. ; 
The USDC rejected resp's argument that such an order could issue only 
under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18 
U.S.C. 2510 - 2520) and, in denying the company's motion, adopted a 
holding of CA 7 that a district court has inherent authority to compel 
the telephone company to provide facilities and technical assistance. 
CA 2 took the case on expedited appeal and reversed, with one dissent. 
CA 2 first noted that pen registers do not fall within the scope 
of Title III because its provisions apply only to surveillance which ------- . 
involves an "interception" of wire communication, or an "aural acqui-
sition", as interception is defined in 18 . u.s.c. 2510(4). The CA 
-3-
found that the legislative history makes clear that there was no Con-
gressional intent to subject pen registers to the prospective standards 
of Title III. The CA cited United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 
553-54 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.). 
CA 2 went on to find that district courts have the power either 
inherently or by analogy to Rule 41, Fed. R. Crim. P. -- to authorize 
pen register surveillance and found this power to be equivalent to the -
power to order a search warrant, and thus subject to the probable cause 
'-- -requirements of the 4th Amendment. The CA concluded that under this 
1, 
standard the order authorizing the installation and use of the pen 
register was properly granted. 
The majority held, however, that the USDC abused its discretion 
in ordering resp to assist -in installing the device. The CA assumed 
arguendo "that a district court has inherent discretionary authority or 
discretionary power under the All Writs Act to compel technical assistance 
by the Telephone Company," but it nevertheless held that "in the absence 
of specific and properly limited Congressional action, .it was an abuse 
of discretion "for the district court to order resp to provide facilities ------------------------------------------' or assistance. 
"'c;;;;; - - ........ 
The majority acknowledged strong justifications for 
the USDC order, but concluded that the issuence of "such an order could 
establish a most undesirable, if not dangerous and unwise precedent 
for the authority of federal courts to impress unwilling aid on private 
third parties." The CA believed that Congress was better equipped than 
the courts to decide the circumstances under which the telephone company 
should be required to render assistance and facilities necessary for 
implementation of a pen register order. 
The dissent disagreed that such orders constitute an abuse of 
discretion in the absence of explicit statutory authorization and reasoned 





better suited to ju~ cial discretion than to a precise or detailed 
statutory blueprint. 
CONTENTIONS: (1) The SG notes that although phrased in terms of abuse 
of discretion, the basis for the CA finding does not lie in any 
particular facts of this case, but is instead a generalized holding that 
it will always be an abuse of judicial discretion to require the tele-
phone company to assist in the installation of a pen register, so long 
as there is no statute expressly authorizing such an order. 
The SG argues that there is substantial conflict among the 
circuits on the issues raised in this case, with CA 7 and CA 8 sustaining 
the validity of such orders under similar circumstances, United States v. 
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir 1976) and United States v. 
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., F. 2d (8th Cir. dec'd Dec. 9, 1976), 
and that there are similar issues now pending in CA 5 and CA 6 and in 
numerous district courts. He urges the importance of resolving this 
issue, noting that delay~ used by litigation of such orders is 
having serious adverse impact on criminal investigations. He also 
notes that the paradoxical consequence of this uncertainty is to impel 
law enforcement authorities toward the use of more intrusive Title III 
wiretaps. 
On the merits, the SG contends that Congress explicitly declined 
tion , Congress could hardly have intended to give the telephone company -
a veto over pen register use. The SG also argues that the government 
has inherent power to require the assistance of citizens in carrying 
out its law enforcement duties, citing as an illustration the posse 
comitatus. 
~5-
On the question of mootness (no stays of the USDC order were 
granted during the litigation and the investigation was completed some 
months prior to the CA decision), the SG urges that the case fits the 
two pronged list of Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 -- (1) 
that the challenged action was too short in duration to be fully 
litigated, including cert, prior to its cessation and -(2) that there 
is a reasonable expectation that the complaining party would be sub-
jected to the same action again. As to (1), the SG notes that the 
order here, like that in Nebraska Press, was by its nature short-lived. 
As to (2), the SG advises that the United States will continue to seek 
to utilize the pen register in the future, with the assistance of the 
telephone company . . 
(2) Resp supports cert~ It agrees that there is a conflict among 
the circuits and notes that the decisions of CA 7 and CA 8 also conflict 
with Application of the United State~ 427 F.2d 639 (1970), in which CA 9 
prior to amendment of Title III, rejected a claim that the courts 
have inherent authority to order telephone companies to assist govern-
ment authorities. 
On the merits, resp contends that the courts do not have autho~ity 
outside the statutory safeguards of Title III to order such assistance 
~/ 
and urge that Title III is broad enough to cover pen registers. 
DISCUSSION: This case is a candidate for cert. The mootness issue 
involved is similar to that present in Nebraska Press and would appear 
to meet the requirements of Bradford. 
1/19/77 
tap 
There is a response. 
Ginty CA Op in petn. 
*/ This latter argument may not be consistent with resp's 
. ...) position before CA 2. See cert petn p. 4a. 
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No. 76-835, United States v. New York Telephone Company 
This is dictated after reviewing the briefs in the 
above case. It is merely an "aid to memory" rather than an 
analysis. Any view expressed or implied is quite tentative. 
* * * * * * * 
This is the "pen register" case, here on cert from 
CA2. The case is quite important to law enforcement (especially 
the FBI), as a decision will determine -- resolving the conflict 
between CA2 and CA7 -- whether federal courts may authorize, upon 
a showing of probable cause, the use of pen register devices. As 
described by CA2 (pet. lA): 
A pen register is a mechanical instrument 
attached to a telephone line, usually at a 
central telephone office, which records the 
outgoing numbers dialed on a particular 
telephone. In the case of a rotary dial 
phone, the pen register records on a paper 
tape dots or dashes equal in number to 
electrical pulses which correspond to the 
telephone number dialed. The device is 
not used to learn or monitor the contents 
of a call nor does it record whether an 
outgoing call is ever completed. For in-
coming calls, the pen register records a 
dash for each ring of the telephone, but 
does not identify the number of the 
telephone from which the incoming call 
No. 76-835 
originated. See United States v. Caplan, 
255 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1966). The 
device used for touch tone telephones, the 
TR-12 touch tone decoder, is very similar to 
a pen register, differing primarily in that 
it causes the digits dialed on the subject 
telephone to be printed in arabic numerals, 
rather than dots or dashes, corresponding 
to the electrical pulses. 
Decisions of Courts Below 
2 • 
A DC in New York, upon finding probable cause, issued 
an order directing respondent (telephone company) to furnish 
government agents investigating gambling operations "all in-
formation, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to 
accomplish the interception [by pen register]" to be attached to 
two designated telephones. If the pen registers were installed 
in the building in which the phones were located, they probably 
would have been detected by the persons under surveillance. The 
FBI therefore requested telephone company assistance through the 
use of a "leased line", connecting with the suspect lines but 
extending to a distant point where the pen registers could be 
connected. The telephone company refused to provide the requested 
assistance. 
On appeal by the government, and in an interesting 
opinion by Judge Medina, CA2 addressed separately "the two ques-
tions raised on this appeal:" 
first, whether the District Court erred in 
authorizing the use of a pen register; and 
; 
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second, whether it erred in ordering the appel-
lant to provide technical assistance to the 
Government. 
3. 
A majority of CA2 (Medina and Feinberg) answered the first question 
affirmatively and the second question negatively. Judge Mansfield 
agreed as to the first and dissented as to the second question. 
CA2's decision with respect to the second question created a direct 
conflict with CA7's opinion in United States v. Illinois Bell 
Telephone, 531 F.2d 809. 
The Questions Before Us 
We granted certiorari at the request of the United States 
only with respect to CA2's decision of the second question above, 
namely (as stated in the petition for cert): 
whether a United States District Court, as part 
of an admittedly valid order authorizing the use 
of a pen register ... , may properly direct the 
telephone company to provide federal law enforce-
ment agents the facilities and technical assistance 
necessary for implementation of the court's order .. 
The telephone company did not file a cross-petition with :~ 
respect to CA2's holding that the DC had authority to authorize the 
use of a pen register. But the telephone company now argues that 
we should decide this threshold issue, and the Solicitor General 
agrees (brief 16). The two questions are closely related, and in 
a substantive sense, the first question of primary authority is 
the more important. The SG thinks we may exercise discretion to 
consider both questions, citing United States v. ITT/Continental 
Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 226-27 n.2. 
No. 76-835 4. 
I am inclined to think we can and should consider both 
questions. 
Authority to Author~ze a Pen Register 
It is argued with considerable force by the telephone 
company that Title III was intended to be comprehensive, that a 
pen register accomplishes "the interception of communication", and 
therefore none can be authorized without full compliance with the 
provisions of Title III. It is pointed out that section 605 of 
the Communications Act of 1934 prohibited the use of pen registers, 
and nothing in Title III specifically changes that rule. 
Although the company's argument in this respect is not 
frivolous, I already have a position on this issue. In United 
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 553-54, I filed an opinion con-
curring in part and dissenting in part, joined by the Chief Justice 
and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. The Court majority in Giordano 
did not reach the pen register issue; it suppressed evidence derived 
from the pen register because this evidence was in turn derived 
from an invalid wiretap. 416 U.S. at 533-534 n.19. In my opinion 
in that case, I said: 
Installation of a pen register device to monitor 
and record the numbers dialed from a particular 
telephone line is not governed by Title III. 
(P. 553.) Although I had no occasion to consider the question with 
the same care that is now presented by the briefs of both parties, 
as well as by the opinions of CA2, I am inclined to adhere to my 
,.. 
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position in Giordano. Judge Medina's opinion (pet. 3A-8A) relies 
in part on my view, but demonstrates that this view is explicitly 
supported by (i) the language of Title III, and particularly its 
definition of "interception"; (ii) the legislative history, in 
which the Senate report stated explicitly that Title III "is not 
designed to prevent the tracing of telephone calls~ the use of 
'pen register', for example, would be permissible"; and (iii) deci-
sions of other courts -- cited by Judge Medina (SA). Moreover, 
as noted by Judge Medina, Professor Blakey (now of the Notre Dame 
Law School and the principal draftsman of Title III) has written 
that Title III was not intended to prevent the tracinq of phone 
calls by the use of a pen register. See 43 Notre Dame L.R. 657. 
The mere fact that Title III does not proscribe pen 
registers does not necessarily answer the first question. The 
government argues that a district court has inherent authority under 
Rule 41, F.R.C.P., to issue such an order, subject only to compliance 
with the Fourth Amendment. This also was my view in Giordano, where 
I said: 
Because of pen register device is not subject 
to the provisions of Title III, the permissibility 
of its use by law enforcement authorities depends 
entirely on compliance with the constitutional 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In this case 
the Government secured a court order, the equivalent 
for this purpose of a search warrant, for each of the 
two extensions of its authorization to use a pen 
register. 
Both CA7 and CA2 concluded that "ample authority [for 
the power of federal courts to issue pen register orders] could be 
; 
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found either in the inherent power of the courts or by analogy to 
Rule 41." (Pet. 7A.) Indeed, Judge Medina concluded: 
the power to order pen register surveillance, 
whether considered a logical derivative of 
Rule 41 or a matter of inherent judicial authority, 
is the equivalent of the power to order a search 
warrant, and is thus subject to the requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment. As the order authorizing 
the installation and use of a pen register was 
here issued by Judge Tenney upon a showing of 
probable cause, we conclude that it was properly 
granted. 
I am inclined to agree with Judge Medina and CA2 and CA7's majority 
on this question. 
Authority to Compel the Telephone Company to Assist 
The second question is more difficult, and a brief summary 
of the arguments pro and con is no substitute for reading CA2's 
opinion, Judge Mansfield's dissent, and the excellent briefs of the 
parties. 
The company argues that, absent legislative authority, a :~ 
federal court has no jurisdiction or authority to order an unwilling 
private citizen -- not before the court as a party -- to assist 
government agents. In responding to the government's reliance upon 
the All Writs Act -- the company asserts that the government is 
urging "an unprecedented and far-reaching application" of that Act, 
without support in judicial authority except for CA7's opinion in 
United States v. Illinois Bell. The company states that other courts 
No. 76-835 7. 
have consistently held that the All Writs Act is not an independent 
source of jurisdiction under any circumstances. 
in the company's brief at p. 23 et seq. 
See cases cited 
The government, somewhat to my surprise, also makes a 
strong argument to the contrary. Starting from the undisputed fact 
that the warrant in this case satisfied the Fourth Amendment, it 
is argued that Rule 41 -- governing the granting of search warrants 
constitutes abundant authority for district judges to issue pen 
register orders. Although Rule 41 authorizes a search for and 
seizure of any "property that constitutes evidence of the commission 
of a criminal offense", and defines property in terms of tangible 
objects, the conclusion does not necessarily follow that intangible 
items, such as the dial impulses recorded by the pen register, are 
excluded. In Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 355-56, and Osborn, 385 U.S. at 
329-30, the Court indicated that valid federal warrants could be 
obtained to seize intangible objects -- in those cases, oral 
communications. But the scope of Rule 41 is only the threshold 
; 
question. The ultimate issue is whether the DC properly ordered the 
telephone company to provide the FBI with the necessary technical 
assistance. Without this assistance, the court's warrant authorizing 
the installation of the pen registers would have no effect despite 
its validity under the Fourth Amendment and the Federal Rules. In 
this situation, it is urged that the All Writs Act constitutes the 
necessary authority. See cases cited on p. 25 of the SG's brief. 
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Responding to the telephone company's argument that there 
is no difference between it and ordinary citizens not before the 
Court, the government correctly emphasizes that respondent is "no 
ordinary third party." It is a public utility with the "primary 
duty of a public utility to serve on reasonable terms all those 
who desire the service it renders." (Citing cases, brief 26.) 
In this case, the government desired and needed leased lines, was 
willing to pay for them, they could be installed easily without 
interruption of other service. Moreover, the telephone company's 
facilities were, according to the finding of probable cause, probably 
being used in the commission of a federal offense. Thus, sustaining 
the DC's order in this case, would create no precedent with respect 
to private third parties. 
As to the possibility that agents might abuse the authority 
and convert pen registers into wiretap interception (a danger per-
ceived by the company) the SG answers that a pen register order is 
limited to the installation and use of a pen register, and any con-
version to wiretapping not only would violate the order, but would · 
subject the parties involved to criminal penalties under Title III. 
The SG also argues that the legislative branch is not 
better equipped (as CA2 suggests) to deal with this problem. The 
issuance of each order as is usually the case with respect to 
search and seizure orders depends upon the facts and circumstances 
of the particular case. 
; 
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Comment 
The second question is troubling. The company's position 
would be easier to sustain in an opinion, as there is no explicit 
legislative authority -- by statute or Rule -- for the DC's order 
requiring technical assistance. But the SG's argument is not 
without force, and I agree that the only reasonable legislation 
would leave wide discretion to district judges. An opinion for 
the government would be limited to telephone companies as utility 
monopolies, obligated to provide reasonable service to the public, 
and as the only party capable (as a practical matter) of enabling 
the valid authorization to install a pen register to be implemented. 
I am not at rest and will await a clerk's memorandum, 
further study and the oral arguments. 
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There are two main issues in tnis case: First, whether z,;-;---
~A,·--,-
the district court has the power to issue an order authorizing ~ 
~-c... 
government agents to use a pen register without complying with ~ 
Title III procedures; and second, if it does, whether it also ~ 6-c;. 
has the power to issue an order directing the telephone ~ 
company to provide the facilities and technical assistance~~~f 
needed to install and operate a pen register. The telephone ~~ 
company contends that pen registers are subject to Title III;~ 
d,c c,_, 
and that if they are not, no other source of power exists to ~ 
authorize either their use or the issuance of orders to the ~ 
telephone company to assist in their installation and  
operation. The government contends that pen registers are ~ 
' within Title III; that orders authorizing use of pen registers J2.-~ 
~ 
'"2.c...o 
may issue under Fed. R. Crim. Pro~ 41, which empowers a 
district court to issue warrants for the seizure of 
~ "property;" and that assistance orders may issue under the All ~ 
~Writs Act. 
I think it is reasonably clear by now that pen registers 
are not subject to Title III. The awkwardness in the 
government's case derives from the difficulty of fitting pen 
2. 
register orders into Rule 4], and from the relative novelty of 
using the All Writs Acr-as a source of power to issue orders 
to persons who are not parties to an action or otherwise 
before the court. It seems to me that it would make better 
sense to hold for the government on all issues. If the Court --------------- ~ ---- -- ----
does so, though, the opinion should be written as narrowly as 
possible on the All Writs Act issue. 
This memo is organized as follows: 
I. MOOTNESS. 
II. WAS THE ORDER AUTHORIZING USE OF A PEN REGISTER 
PROPERLY ISSUED? 
A. Is this question properly before the Court? 
B. Does Title III govern authorization of the use 
of pen registers? 
C. If Title III does not govern, from whence comes 
the power to issue an order authorizing use of a pen register? 
III. POWER TO ORDER RESPONDENT TO ASSIST. 
IV. ASSUMING POWER, WAS IT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO 
ISSUE THE ASSISTANCE ORDER? 
* * * * * 
I. MOOTNESS. 
The government tells us that both the district court and 
the court of appeals denied stays of the order here contested 
pending appeal, and the respondent complied with the order . 
Hence, there is a possibility that the issue of the order's 
validity could be found moot. Faced with the same situation, 
CA5 found a case had been mooted. It held the case was not one 
that necessarily would continue to evade review, compare 
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 
(1911); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1974), 
because the district court or court of appeals could (and 
should) stay the effectiveness of the order pending appeal the 
; 
3. 
next time the issue arose. 
The government argues this analysis was wrong because 
even if the effectiveness of an order is stayed, the probable 
cause that supports the order will become "stale" during the 
pendency of the appeal and the order will become 
unenforceable. Because the immediate controversy will become 
dead whether the order is stayed or not, the issue is one that 
is capable of repetition yet evading review. And the telephone 
company has taken a hard line around the country against such 
orders, so that the issue will keep arising. See Petn at 
17-19. 
I think the government makes a good point, w~ ch CA5 --
overlooked. There may be one other way the issue could arise --------
, without becoming moot: the telephone company could defy an 
assistance order, be held in contempt, and argue on appeal 
that the underlying order was invalid. This seems to me a 
pretty harsh gauntlet to make the telephone company run in 
order to get appellate review, especially in view of the fact 
that there is no guarantee a court could or would review the 
validity of the underlying order in contempt proceedings 
anyway. I therefore would favor reaching the merits of this 
case. 
II. WAS THE ORDER AUTHORIZING USE OF A PEN REGISTER 
I 
PROPERLY ISSUED? 9~~ 
The ~~ . A. Is this question properly before the Court? 
government questions whether resp is in a position 
here that orders authorizing use of a pen register 
,-~vt..-
to argue ,, ~ ,\ 
are subject / 
4. 
to Title III. Both courts below addressed the Title III issue 
and decided it in favor of the government, and the 
government's "question presented" was phrased so as to exclude 
it from consideration here: 
Whether a United States District Court, as part of 
an admittedly valid order authorizing the use of a pen~ 
register ..• may properly direct the telephone~ompany to 
provide federal law enforcement agents the facilities and 
technical assistance necessary for implementation of the 
court's order ... 
Petn at 2 (emph added). The government concedes that the 
general rule is that, "a party satisfied with a judgment 
should not have to appeal from it in order to defend it on any 
ground which the record and law permit." Brief for Petr at 
17-18, quoting Stern, When to Cross-Appeal or Cross-Petition -
Certainty or Confusion, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 763, 774 (1974). It 
suggests, however, that the following statement describes the 
posture of this case: 
Mills [v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)] 
and [NLRB v.] Express Publishing Co., [312 U.S. 426 
(1941)]1:)oth appear to hold that when the logical result 
of acceptance of a respondent's additional argument would 
be to change more of the judgment than is brought into 
issue by the initial appeal, a cross-petition must be 
filed even though the respondent is not asking that the 
judgment be altered but is content that it be affirmed. 
Brief for Petr at 17, quoting Stern, supra, at 772. This case 
may be distinguishable from Mills and Express Publishing, 
though. 
In Mills, the court of appeals affirmed a district court 
holding that a proxy statement was materially misleading, but 
it remanded for a new determination of whether the statement 




review of the court of appeals' decision on the causation 
issue. Defendant did not cross-petition, but it nonetheless 
sought to support the court of appeals' judgment on the ground 
the statement was not materially misleading. The Court refused 
to consider the question: 
Petitioners naturally did not raise this question in 
their petition for certiorari, and respondents filed no 
cross-petition. Since reversal of the Court of Appeals' 
ruling on this question would not dictate affirmance of 
that court's judgment, but rather elimination of 
petitioners' rights thereunder, we will not consider the 
question in these circumstances. [cites] 
396 U.S., at 381 n.4. In Express Publishing the NLRB found 
unfair labor practices by resp and ordered resp to bargain, to 
cease and desist the unfair practices, and to post notices 
that it would. The court of appeals struck the latter two 
portions of the order, leaving only the bargaining order. The 
NLRB petitioned for cert. Although resp did not 
cross-petition, it sought to support the court of appeals' 
modification of the NLRB order by arguing that the NLRB's 
basic finding of an unfair practice was not supported by the 
evidence. The Court held resp could not raise this issue in 
the absence of a cross-petition. 312 U.S., at 430-431. 
Stern, supra, interprets these cases, together with 
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973) and NLRB v. 
International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48 (1972), as presenting 
situations that fall between the rule that the party who won 
below may advance any arguments to support the judgment 
without cross-petitioning, and the rule that a respondent 
must cross-petition if he seeks to modify the judgment below. 
6. 
In these cases, the respondent does not seek to modify the 
judgment below, but he does seek to support the judgment on 
grounds that logically would result in modification of the 
judgment. In Mills, acceptance of respondent's argument would 
have resulted in dismissal rather than remand; in Express 
Publishing, it would have resulted in vacation of the entire 
NLRB order, not just the cease-and-desist and posting orders. 
As Stern explains it: 
The footnote in the Mills opinion suggests that an 
argument which would logically dictate an alteration in 
the judgment which no party has sought must, even when 
submitted only as a ground for supporting the judgment, 
be treated as a request for a change in the judgment 
which cannot be presented without a cross-appeal or 
cross-petition. 
87 Harv. L. Rev., at 774. 
United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 
(1975) suggests Stern's reading of Mills and the other cases 
was correct, along with hinting at acceptance of his plea that 
the decision whether to consider a respondent's argument in 
this situation should involve an element of discretion. In 
Continental Baking, the FTC and resp agreed to a consent order 
prohibiting resp from acquiring new companies for ten years. 
Some time later, the United States sued alleging resp had 
acquired three companies in violation of the consent decree 
and seeking penalties for each day resp continued to hold the 
acquired companies. The district court found two of the 
acquisitions were violations of the consent decree, but it 
imposed penalties only for the days the acquisitions 
themselves took place. The court of appeals held only one of 
7. 
the acquisitions was a violation, but it affirmed the holding 
that a penalty could be imposed only for the day the 
acquisition took place. The government petitioned for review 
of the latter holding. Resp did not cross-petition, but it 
sought to support the judgment on the ground, inter alia, that 
no violations at all had occurred. This Court refused to 
consider the argument, stating, 420 U.S., at 226 n.2: 
Respondent recognizes that, not having 
cross-petitioned, it cannot attack the judgment insofar 
as it sustained the findings of violations and imposed 
penalties for such violations. [cites] Respondent argues 
that it may nonetheless seek to sustain the Court of 
Appeals limitation on the penalties on the theory that no 
penalty should have been awarded at all. Ordinarily, 
however, as a matter of practice and control of our 
docket, if not of our power, we do not entertain a 
challenge to a decision on the merits where the only 
petition for certiorari presents solely a question as to 
the remedy granted for a liability found to exist, even 
if the respondent is willing to accept whtever judgment 
has already been entered against him [citing Strunk, 
International Van Lines, and Express Publishing]. We 
follow that rule of practice in this case, particularly 
because the issue of whether there were any violations 
concerns only a particular order as applied to a discrete 
set of facts and therefore would not merit this Court's 
grant of a petition for certiorari. 
I think one could make a good argument that the instant 
case does not, as the government suggests, fit the 
Mills/Continental Baking mold at all. The judgment below was 
that resp cannot be ordered to assist in installing the pen 
register. If resp's Title III argument is considered and 
accepted, the judgment will remain the same: resp still cannot 
be ordered to assist in installing the pen register. Here, 
unlike the other cases, the logical result of accepting the 




The similarity between this case and the others, which 
the government does not make very clear. is that reversal on 
the Title III issue would have the additional consequence of 
preventing the government from using this or other pen 
registers without Title III authorization. In that respect, 
reversal on the Title III issue could be said, in Mills' 
words, to result in the "elimination of petitioner's rights" 
under the judgment. But unlike the other cases, resp logically 
should not gain anything more than it had from the judgment 
below. 
Even if the government is correct that this case is like 
Mills and the others, I think its suggestion is sound that the 
Court, in the exercise of its discretion, is free to consider - ---------
the Title III issue anyway. The Title III issue might be 
independently certwo~thy (although most courts have agreed on 
its resolution)i if it were, it would meet the test hinted at 
in the Continental Baking footnote. Perhaps more important is 
the fact that this case would be truncated in rather a strange 
fashion if the Court considered only the question whether resp 
can be ordered to assist in installing the pen register, while 
assuming the order authorizing the use of the pen register was 
valid. This is so because the government's argument that the 
All Writs Act authorized the assistance order depends upon the 
existence of a valid order authorizing use of a pen register. 
B. Does Title III govern authorization of the use of pen 
registers? It is conceded that the authorization order here 
was not obtained through the procedures of Title III. 
9. 
Respondent argues that this is fatal because pen registers are 
subject to the provisions of that title. The government makes 
main three points in arguing that pen registers are not 
governed by Title III. 
First, the statute creates procedures governing "the 
interception of a wire or oral communication." 18 u.s.c. 
§2518(1); see id., passim. §2510(4) states that 
"intercept" means the aural acquisition of the contents 
of any wire or oral communication through the use of any 
electronic, mechanical, or other device. 
The government says a pen register responds to electrical 
impulses caused by the dialing of a telephone, not to sounds; 
and it records the impulses it receives on paper. Hence, the 
acquisition is not "aural." Moreover, §2510(8) defines 
"contents" to "include[ ] any information concerning the 
identity of the parties or the existence ..• of the 
communication." A pen register does not indicate whether a 
call was answered or whether a busy signal was encountered. 
Therefore, it does not acquire the "contents" of a 
communication, even to the extent of revealing its "existence." 
Second, the legislative history strongly suggests that 
Congress did not intend Title III to cover pen registers. 
S.Rep. No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1968) states: 
Other forms of surveillance are not within the proposed 
legislation .... The proposed legislation is not designed 
to prevent the tracing of phone calls. The use of a 'pen 
register,' for example, would be permissible. But see 
United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966). The 
proposed leg1slatTorlis intended to protect the privacy 
of the communication itself and not the means of 
communication. 
The government says the "but see" cite to Dote was a 
10. 
convention used throughout the Senate Report to indicate cases 
that Title III would overrule, and casts no doubt on the 
1 / 
statement that precedes it.~ 
Finally, four members of this Court have agreed that, 
"The installation of a pen register device to monitor and 
record the numbers dialed from a particular telephone line is 
not governed by Title III." United States v. Giordano, 416 
U.S. 505, 553 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J., and Rehnquist, 
J.). In so concluding, this opinion accepted the same 
statutory-construction and legislative-history arguments that 
the government makes here. See id. at 553-554. Moreover, 
nearly every court that has considered the question agrees, as ----- - - - -did both lower courts and the dissenter in the instant 
---z-r----
case. 
Resp makes a more roundabout argument for concluding that 
pen registers are governed by Title III and that, if they are 
not, they are prohibited. Before Title III was enacted, 
Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 u.s.c. §605, 
provided: 
[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall 
intercept any communication and divulge or publish the 
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or 
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person 
This Court held §605 was violated by state and federal law 
enforcement officers' wiretapping. E.g., Benanti v. United 
States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 
338 (1939); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). A 
11. 
few lower courts, relying on statements in these cases, held 
§605 also proscribed use of pen registers. United States v. 
Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966), affirming United States v. 
Guglienno, 245 F.Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1965); United States v. 
Caplan, 255 F.Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (Mccree, J.). These 
courts rejected the government's contention that a pen 
register did not "intercept [a] communication" within the 
meaning of §605. The Dote court, stretching a bit, thought: 
Even if a call is not answered, a call at a certain time, 
or a certain number of rings, or repeated calls may well 
be a pre-arranged message or signal. The ringing of a 
telephone, therefore, may of itself be a communication, 
and a device, attached to a telephone line, which 
indicates to a third party that such a communication is 
taking place or is about to take place, intercepts it. 
371 F.2d, at 181; accord, Caplan, supra, 255 F.Supp., at 808. 
Resp argues that Congress, knowing pen registers as well 
as wiretaps had been held within the prohibition of §605, must 
have intended to bring pen registers as well as wiretaps 
within the scope of Title III. If pen registers are not within 
the scope of Title III, then they must still be prohibited by 
§605. The government's emphasis on §2510(4) 's "unartful" 
definition of "intercept" as the "aural acquisition" of 
communications "ignores the clear Congressional intent to 
legislate comprehensively and preemptively in the area of the 
interception of wire and oral communications." It also would 
leave outside the scope of Title III taps of teletype, 
facsimile, and data transmissions. Moreover, as Caplan and 
Dote hold, a pen register does reveal the "existence of a 
communication." The statement in the Senate Report that "pen 
12. 
registers ... would be permissible," together with the "but 
see" cite to Dote, imply only that telephone companies remain 
free to use pen registers in the ordinary course of their 
business, because the Dote court said it did not mean to 
prohibit such use by telephone companies. But it does not 
imply that law enforcement officers can use pen registers. 
I do not find these arguments convincing. The choice is 
Cl,' 
not, as resp intirrtes, between holding pen registers are 
within the scope of Title III, and holding they still are 
prohibited by §605. This is so because §803 of Title III 
amended §605 to read, "no person shall intercept any radio 
communication ..• " This removes pen registers from §605, - -effectively overruling Dote and Caplan. On this point, the 
3 I 
courts again are nearly unanimous.~ Resp's construction 
of the Senate Report also seems to me unconvincing. If the 
Senate committee had meant only to indicate continuing 
approval of telephone companies' routine use of pen registers, 
I think it would have said, "pen registers ... would be 
permissible. See United States v. Dote ... " Although one can 
quibble over whether a pen register reveals the "existence" of 
a communication, so as to acquire its "contents" within the 
meaning of sections 2510(8) and 2518(1), the fact remains that 
the interception is not an "aural" acquisition. In sum, I see 
no reason to change the conclusion you reached on this issue . .. 
in crrdano. 
C. If Title III does not govern, from whence comes the 




Assuming that pen registers are not subject to the 
authorization procedures of Title III and are not prohibited 
by §605, the government has some difficulty finding power for 
a magistrate to issue a warrant authorizing use of a pen 
register. It bases its entire argument on Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 
41, apparantly abandoning the alternative argument it made 
below, see Petn App. at 6a, that the district court has 
"inherent" power to issue such a warrant. 
The government's problem is that Rule 41, authorizing the 
issuance of search warrants, refers throughout to the seizure 
of "property." The central section, R.41(b), states: 
Property Which May Be Seized with a Warrant. A warrant 
may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any 
(1) property that constitutes evidence of the commission 
of a criminal offense; (2) contraband, the fruits of 
crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or (3) 
property designed or intended for use or which is or has 
been used as the means of committing a criminal offence. 
See also R. 41 (a) (empowering judges "within the district 
wherein the property is located" to issue warrants); 
R.41(c) (requiring warrant to "identify[ ] the property" to be 
seized); R.41(d) (requiring "written inventory of any property 
taken"); R.41(e) (allowing aggrieved person to move "for the 
return of the property"). Rule 41(h) defines "property" as 
follows: 
The term "property" is used in this rule to include 
documents, books, papers and any other tangible objects. 
The government concedes that the electrical impulses received ----by a pen register are not "tangible objects." It argues, 
... z.w:a __ ___ 
'-· however, that the listing of what is "property" in Rule 41(h) 
is not meant to be exhaustive. This is shown by the phrasing 
,, 
of the sentence 
include •.. " 
14. 
"The term 'property' is used ... to 
in contrast to other definitions in Rule 
4l(h) that say terms "mean" particular things. Hence, 
intangible as well as tangible "objects" may be "property" 
within the definition. The government would have the Court go 
so far as to hold that Rule 41 "is congruent with the Fourth 
Amendment." 
There is considerable difficulty with this argument. A 
strong argument can be made that "include" in Rule 4l(h) 
refers to "any other tangible objects," so that the definition 
of "property" is exhausted by tangible objects. Moreover, to 
accept the government's argument would render at least 
R.4l(e), the return-of-property section, meaningless where the 
"property" consists of electrical impulses. And the courts 
that have considered this argument have been uniformly 
skeptical. The court of appeals in the instant case thought, 
"the electrical impulses recorded by pen registers are not 
'property' in the strict sense of that term as it is used in 
Rule 4l(b) ... " Petn App. at 7a; see also United States v. 
Southwestern Bell, note 2 supra, 546 F.2d, at 245 n.5; United 
States v. Illinois Bell, note~ supra, 531 F.2d, at 813. 
On the other hand, the government is correct that this 
Court has suggested Rule 41 might be interpreted "flexibly" in 
connection with electronic eavesdropping. In Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) the Court held warrantless 
electronic eavesdropping on a public telephone booth violated 






suitable warrant procedure might be devised, and that it need 
not be identical to conventional warrant procedure. Among 
other things, the Court said: 
Nor do the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
impose an inflexible requirement of prior notice. Rule 
4l(d) does require federal officers to serve upon the 
person searched a copy of the warrant and a receipt 
describing the material [not "property"!] obtained, but 
it does not invariably require that this be done before 
the search takes place. 
389 U.S., at 356 n.16. The government argues this statement 
implies that electronic eavesdropping can be authorized under 
Rule 41, despite the intangible nature of the conversations 
"seized." There is modest force to this argument, although the 
Court's attention clearly was not focussed on that issue. 
Perhaps the greatest attraction of the government's 
argument is that if it is accepted, one need not search 
outside Rule 41 for the power to issue a warrant authorizing 
use of a pen register. The problem is demonstrated in the 
instant case, where the court of appeals thought such power 
existed either as "a logical derivative of Rule 41 or as a 
matter of inherent judicial authority." Petn App. at 8a. Judge 
Mansfield, dissenting, appears to have agreed. See id. at 17a. 
Similarly, the court in Southwestern Bell thought, "The 
[district] court's power to order pen register surveillance is 
the equivalent of the power to order a search warrant and is 
inherent in the district court," and it found Rule 41 "by 
analogy, supportive of our conclusion." 546 F.2d, at 245 & 
n.5. The court in Illinois Bell thought the district court's 
"commonsense approach" in issuing an order based on probable 
; 
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cause "was a valid exercise of authority," 531 F.2d, at 813, 
but it did not say where that authority came from. 
These courts all have found support for their conclusions 
in your Giordano opinion, which said: 
Because a pen register device is not subject to the 
provisions of Title III, the permissiblity of its use by 
law enforcement authorities depends entirely on 
compliance with the constitutional requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment. [n.4] In this case the Government 
secured a court order, the equivalent for this purpose of 
a search warrant, for each of the two extensions of its 
authorization to use a pen register. 
4. The Government suggests that the use of a pen 
register may not constitute a search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. I need not address this 
question, for in my view the constitutional guarantee, 
assuming its applicability, was satisfied in this case. 
The assumption seems to be that if the pen register 
authorization in Giordano met Fourth Amendment requirements, 
it must have been within the district court's power, where(ever 
derived. Although the government suggests in passing that such 
power might be derived from the Fourth Amendment itself, with 
a "cf." cite to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971), see Brief for Petr at 25 n.27, the courts 
of appeals have not risen to this bait. 
The pressures which have forced these courts to fall back 
on the "inherent" power of the district courts are apparent. 
Having concluded that pen registers are not covered by Title 
III, they could not accept resp's argument that orders 
authorizing use of pen registers could be issued under that 
title. But if Rule 41 also does not authorize issuance of a 
pen register order, and if no other source of power to do so 
exists, then pen registers simply cannot be used. This 
17. 
conclusion would be absurd in light of the facts that the 
Senate Report said they could be used; that Congress evidently 
did not want to place pen registers under as stringent 
procedural requirements as Title III contains, let alone 
prevent their use altogether; and that pen registers plainly 
are less intrusive than wiretaps, so that their use should be 
preferred over that of wiretaps. Hence, the courts found the 
power to issue pen register orders "inherent" in the district 
courts. 
I am not sure whether the right way out of this quandry 
is to stretch to find the power in Rule 41, as the government 
would have the Court do, or to fall back on some vague notion 
of inherent power. What I am pretty sure of is that one or 
the other solution will have to be adopted. The three other 
alternatives are to hold that pen registers cannot be used at 
all because there is no source of power for authorizing their 
use; to hold that they are covered by Title III after all, so 
that they can be authorized through that title's procedures; 
or to hold that pen registers do not effect "seizures," so 
that the Fourth Amendment requires no authorization. I doubt 
whether any of these three alternatives would be acceptable. 
I note one other possible problem with finding this order 
was issued under Rule 41. Rule 41 states that a warrant 
issued under it "shall command the officer to search, within a 
specified period of time not to exceed 10 days, the person or 
place named for the property specified." The order in this 
case made no reference to Rule 41, and it authorized the pen 
~ 
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register for 20 days. Hence, the government's argument that 
the order was authorized by Rule 41 may not square with the 
intention of the district court. The government hints that the 
Rule 41 requirement should be read as meaning the search must 
begin within 10 days, but that in the case of a pen register 
it says nothing about how long it should last. See Brief for 
Petr at 24 n.26. It might be possible to finesse this problem 
by holding the order was issued under Rule 41, while saying 
the issue of the compliance of this order with Rule 41 is not 
before the Court. 
III. POWER TO ORDER RESP TO ASSIST. 
Assuming the district court had power outside the 
confines of Title III to issue an order authorizing use of a 
pen register, the difficult question in the case becomes 
whether that court had the power to order resp to provide the 
necessary facilities and assistance. The majority below, 
"assum[ing] arguendo, ... that a district court has inherent 
discretionary power under the All Writs Act to compel 
technical assistance by the Telephone Company," Petn App. at 
13a, held it was an abuse of that discretion for the district 
court to have exercised the power. Judge Mansfield agreed 
that discretionary power existed under the All Writs Act, but 
he disagreed with the holding that the district court had 
abused its discretion. 
In its brief to this Court, the government eschews its 
earlier reliance on the district court's inherent authority, 
4 I 
compare Petn at 16,~ preferring to rest its case solely 
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on the All Writs Act, 28 u.s.c. §165l(a): 
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act 
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate 
in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to 
the usages and principles of law. 
The argument is that the district court had jurisdiction to 
and did issue an order authorizing use of a pen register. 
Without the assistance and facilities of resp, the order would 
be of no effect. Therefore, to give effect to the 
authorization order, the district court had power under the 
All Writs Act to order the telephone company to provide 
facilities and assistance. 
Respondent replies that it is well-settled that the All 
Writs Act is not an independent source of jurisdiction. E.g., 
·"---" M'Intire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504 (1813); Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 120 
U.S. 540 (1887); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Hager, 
203 U.S. 109 (1906). The government contends that Rule 41 
provides the jurisdictional basis for exercising power under 
the All Writs Act, but there is a fatal flaw in this 
reasoning: Rule 41 does not provide jurisdiction over the 
telephone company, which was not before the court when the 
assistance order issued. In this respect, resp might aptly ~ 
~ 
quote (although it does not) Commercial Security Bank v. ~.-
Walker Bank & Trust Co., 456 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1972): ~ 
An order may issue pursuant to [§165l(a)] to preserve 
jurisdiction already acquired, but a court may not, by 
said order, acquire jurisdiction over an individual or 
property not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction. 
In addition, resp argues, the experience with assistance 




the United States, 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970) the government 
had obtained an order under Title III authorizing the wiretap 
of a telephone line. The government sought an order from the 
district court directing the telephone company to provide the 
necessary technical assistance in installing the tap, but that 
court denied the order for want of jurisdiction to issue it. 
In CA9, the government argued that power to issue the order 
was implicit in Title III; that it could be derived from the 
ancient power of the sheriff to call a posse comitatus; and 
that it existed under the All Writs Act. CA9 held the power 
could not be implied from Title III, and continued: 
We are not convinced that the authority ..• to 
compel a telephone company to assist in the investigation 
of suspected law violators can be derived, by analogy, 
from the power law enforcement officers may have to 
assemble a posse comitatus to keep the peace and to 
pursue law violators. Nor do we find, outside Title III, 
any district court authority, statutory or inherent, for 
entry of such an order. 
427 F.2d, at 644. Shortly after this decision, Congress 
amended Title III to provide authority for issuing an 
assistance order for Title III wiretaps, 18 U.S.C. §2518(4): 
An order authorizing the interception of a wire or oral 
communication shall, upon request of the applicant, 
direct that a communication common carrier, landlord, 
custodian or other person shall furnish the applicant 
forthwith all information, facilities, and technical 
assistance necessary to accomplish the interception .•. 
Because Congress has not provided parallel authority outside 
Title III authorizing assistance orders for pen registers, 
Application of the United States stands as good precedent that 
such authority does not exist. After all, as Judge Lay argued 
in dissent on this point in Southwestern Bell, "Congress does 
not legislate needlessly." 546 F.2d, at 248. Even the majority 
; 
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in Southwestern Bell did not rely on the All Writs Act, 
instead finding power to issue an assistance order inherent in 
the district court. See 546 F.2d, at 246 & n.7. 
I have found surprisingly little precedent~ r commentary 
- fl121Z-~ ~) 
on the question whether §16511 a) Aempowers a court to issue 
"' 
orders to persons who are not parties to an action before it 
or otherwise within the court's jurisdiction, if such is 
believed "necessary in aid of [the court's] 
jurisdiction [] . " Judge Mansfield, dissenting below, 
cited Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 273 
F.Supp. 1 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (three judge court), aff 'd mem. sub 
nom. Osbourne v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 389 U.S. 
579 (1968) as authority for the proposition that, "The power 
conferred by the [All Writs] Act extends to issuing 
injunctions and other writs against persons who, though not 
parties to the original action, may thwart the effectuation of 
the court's decision." In Mississippi Valley Barge Line, the 
ICC, pursuant to a district court decision and order, entered 
an order annulling the transfer of a Water Carrier Certificate 
(authorizing the holder to conduct towing operations on inland 
waterways) from one Zubik to one Pittsburgh Towing Company. 
Zubik died, and his executors executed a power of attorney to 
Osbourne, Pittsburgh Towing's president, giving him authority 
to file a tariff with the ICC to operate the towing route in 
the executors' names. Osbourne filed the tariff and 
competitors sued the ICC, the executors, Pittsburgh Towing, 
and Osbourne, alleging the transaction was a subterfuge to 
22. 
circumvent the earlier court and ICC orders. They prayed that 
the ICC be ordered to set aside the tariff and that the other 
defendants be enjoined from violating the earlier court and 
ICC orders. 
Osbourne's attorney argued that, because Osbourne was not 
a party to the original action and had not been served in the 
instant action, the district court did not have jurisdiction 
to enter an injunction against him. The district court 
disagreed, saying: 
It is well settled that the courts of the United 
States have the inherent and statutory (28 u.s.c. §1651) 
power and authority to enter such orders as may be 
necessary to enforce and effectuate their lawful orders 
and judgments, and to prevent them from being thwarted 
and interfered with by force, guile, or otherwise. 
[cites] This rule applies whether or not the person 
charged with the violation of the judgment or decree was 
originally a party defendant to the action. 
273 F.Supp., at 6. Osbourne appealed to this Court, which 
granted appellees' motion to affirm without an opinion and 
"without prejudice to the presentation of an appropriate 
motion in the [district court] for a modification of the 
injunction." 389 U.S. 579 (1968). Although Mississippi Valley 
Barge Line thus can be read as providing some support for the 
government's position, one commentator has suggested it also 
can be explained on the ground that Osbourne was "acting in 
concert with the original parties and therefore [was] within 
the scope of [an injunction issuable under Fed. R. Civ. Pro.] 
5 I 
65(d) .~ Comment, Community Resistance to School 
Desegregation: Enjoining the Undefinable Class, 44 U. Chi. L. 
Rev • 111 , 13 4 n. 12 5 ( 19 7 7 ) • 
,. 
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The same commentator asserts that as a general rule, 
"When a court issues an injunctive order pursuant to the All 
Writs Act, it must have previously acquired jurisdiction over 
the injunction defendant or fully complied with the [Rule 65] 
procedures for issuance of ex parte temporary restraints." Id. 
at 134. Primary reliance is placed on Commercial Security 
Bank, quoted supra. In that case the United States had 
foreclosed on property of a coal company in state court and 
was about to conduct a sheriff's sale of the property. 
Commercial Bank brought an impleader action in federal court 
against Walker Bank to determine ownership of certain shares 
of stock in the coal company. The United States was not 
served in the impleader action. 
After the district court determined the ownership of the 
stock, it issued an ex parte order, supposedly under the All 
Writs Act, restraining the United States from conducting the 
sheriff's sale for a "reasonable time." On appeal, CAlO held 
the district court lacked the power to issue such an order: 
Section 165l(a) does not operate to confer jurisdiction; 
ancillary jurisdiction is provided where jurisdiction is 
otherwise already lodged in the court .••. An order may 
issue pursuant to this statute to preserve jurisdiction 
already lawfully acquired, but a court may not, by said 
order acquire jurisdiction over an individual or property 
not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction. The issuance 
of the order by the trial court here was in no way 
necessary to preserve its jurisdiction ... The 
interpleader action was not an in rem proceeding against 
the assets of [the coal company], nor was the United 
States served with process in the interpleader action. 
456 F.2d, at 1355-56 (footnotes omitted). It will be noted 
that the holding could be read as being based on the lack of 
necessity, as well as the failure to make the United States a 
24. 
party to the action. 
I have not found much beyond these cases. The All Writs 
Act has been on the books for a long time {it was enacted as 
section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 81, see 
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 & n.6 (1954)), and 
I have found hints that it used to serve as authority for 
issuing subpoenas duces tecum to persons who were not parties 
to civil suits. See American Lithographic v. Werkmeister, 221 
U.S. 603, 610 (1911); United States v. McHie, 196 F. 586, 588 
{N. D. Ill. 1912) {" [A] number of the writs issued under 
section 716 [Revised Statutes, now the All Writs Act], and in 
frequent use, run against third persons. This is true of 
injunction, execution, subpoena ad testificandum, subpoena 
duces tecum, and prohibition."); cf. United States v. Field, 
193 F.2d 92 {2d Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 908 
~/ 
(1942). As recently as 1969, the Court has held 
§165l{a) provides authority for the district court to issue 
discovery orders, at least against parties, in §2255 habeas 
proceedings. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299-300 (1969). 
But cf. In re Shephard, 3 F. 12 {E.D.N.Y. 1880) {writ will not 
issue under §716 to compel third party to produce articles not 
papers or documents because not "agreeable to usage of law" of 
subpoenas). 
On the other hand, I found Hospoder v. United States, 209 
F.2d 427 {3d Cir. 1953), which held that §165l{a) mandamus 
would not lie because the official against whom relief would 
run was not joined as a party. And in United States v. 
25. 
Schiavo, 504 F. 2d 1 ( 3d Cir.) (en bane) , cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 1096 (1974) the court, considering whether to uphold an 
order to the press not to publish certain information about a 
criminal defendant, found it "unnecessary to decide whether 
the terms of 28 u.s.c. §165l(a) authorize the district court 
to issue such an essentially injunctive order affecting 
persons who are not parties in aid of its criminal 
jurisdiction." Id. at 6 n.10. 
The competing analogies in this case may be to an 
injunction, on one hand, and to a subpoena duces tecum, on the 
• - may -
other. Both"'require, in respondent's words, "affirmative 
acts" by the recipient of the order. The general rule is that 
an injunction cannot be enforced against persons who are not 
\....., parties to an action or "associate[s] or confederate[s]" of 
parties. Chase National Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 436-437 
7 / 
(1934) (Brandeis, J.) .- See generally Developments in the 
Law - Injunctions, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 994, 1028-1031 (1965). The 
subpoena, on the other hand, ordinarily does issue ex parte 
to non-parties. One might be able to build on an analogy to 
subpoenas in this case, arguing the telephone company is the 
only person who can "deliver" the needed information to the 
government. Also, one could argue that here, as in the 
third-party subpoena case, the party seeking information and 
the party with the information are not adversaries on any 
underlying issue; hence, there is little need for a prior 
hearing, like that held before an injunction issues, to 
adjudicate the relative rights of the parties. Compare note 7 
supra. It also seems to me that as long as the telephone 
company receives notice of the order after it issues 
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which it always will some of the dangers associated with 
an injunction aimed at a non-party are absent. 
The analogy to a subpoena is imperfect, though, because 
there are no judicial proceedings, akin to a grand jury 
investigation or a trial, pending. Pushed too hard, the 
analogy might suggest that there was no Fourth Amendment 
"search" here at all. Cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435 (1976). And a person who is subpoenaed can obtain a prior 
test of the subpoena's validity by filing a motion to quash 
(not unlike the motion to show cause filed by the telephone 
company here). 
Although the government does not effectively join issue 
T~ 
on the general problem of orders to third parties under . 
§165l(a), it does offer a variety of reasons for 
CcO.~ 
~I~ 
differentiating the respondent here from an "ordinary third ~ 
' ' 
party" to a search war rant. It argues the telephone company ~ ' 
is under an obligation to furnish "service upon reasonable 
request therefor," 47 U.S.C. §20l(a), so that it was not 
privileged to refuse to cooperate. The telephone company 
replies, not without force, that it has no obligation to 
provide this service to the government or anyone else. 
,. 
The government also argues the telephone company is no 1,t,,,;f ~ 
to ~ innocent third party, because there is probable cause 
believe that its facilities are being used to conduct illegal~ 
activities. I think there is more force to this argument. In 
"- ; 
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a way, the case is like one where the government serves a 
search warrant on a person who owns property where others have 
hidden evidence of crime. The owner may be unhappy about the 
intrusion, and perfectly innocent himself; but because his 
property is being used for crime, his privacy interest must 
give way. The difference here is that the telephone company 
not only is required to admit government agents to its 
property and allow them to "search" its "facilities;" it also 
must aid in the undertaking. Although this difference is the 
point of much of the telephone company's argument, it seems to 
me that it is less objectionable to require a private person 
to help the police search his own property when he is not the 
target of the search. But see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, cert. 
filed, No.76-]484, and Bergna v. Stanford Daily, cert. filed, 
No.76-]600 (search is more offensive when aimed at third 
party) (these cases appear to be likely grants) .Moreover, the 
telephone company has not argued that the proposed "search" 
will intrude on its expectation of privacy. But cf. Marshall 
v. Barlow's Inc., No.76-1143 (inspection of commercial 
premises). 
Another factor that must be considered in deciding 
whether power exists under §1651 is whether the order 
requested is "agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 
It has been said that, "In determining what auxiliary writs 
are 'agreeable to the usages and principles of law,' we look 
first to the common law." United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 
205, 221 n.35 (1952). At the same time, though, §1651 writs 
28. 
are not limited to those available at common law: 
[The All Writs Act] says that the writ must be agreeable 
to the usages and principles of "law," a term which is 
unlimited by the common law or the English law. And 
since "law" is not a static concept, but expands and 
develops as new problems arise, we do not believe that 
the forms of the habeas corpus writ authorized by [the 
All Writs Act] are only those recognized in this country 
in 1789, when the original Judiciary Act containing the 
substance of this section came into existence. In short, 
we do not read [the All Writs Act] as an ossification of 
the practice and procedure of more than a century and a 
half ago. Rather it is a legislatively approved source of 
procedural instruments designed to achieve "the rational 
ends of law." Adams v. United States ex rel. Mccann, [317 
U.S. 269,] 273. 
Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 282 (1948); see also Bank of 
the United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51, 55-56 
(1825) (writs conformable to state practice, as well as to 
common law, issuable under §165l(a)); Hills & Co. v. Hoover, 
220 U.S. 329, 336-337 (1911) (writs not restricted to those 
availble in state courts, though}. 
In this case, the government does not suggest the order 
it seeks is of a kind commonly used in the past, although its 
petition for cert suggested an analogy to the posse comitatus. 
See note 4 supra. (One could argue the power the government 
contends for here is less dangerous than the old posse 
comitatus power because a neutral magistrate is interposed 
between the policeman and the citizen he wishes to "impress 
into service.{\;} CA2 noted in the instant case that CA7's 
decision in Illinois Bell "was the first time a court 
construed the All Writs Act, or the notion of inherent 
judicial power, to provide justification for the entry of such 
an order in aid of its jurisdiction to order a search and 
29. 
seizure." Petn App. at 12a. Thus, petr argues the order sought 
is a novelty to the law and ought not be found within 
§165l{a). On the other hand, the government might argue that 
the fact that explicit authority for such orders in the case 
of wiretaps was placed in Title III, as amended, demonstrates 
Congress' feeling that there was nothing objectionable about 
using such orders. I doubt whether the "usages and 
principles" factor should be decisive in this case, although 
it certainly would help if more analogies could be produced. 
My own feeling on this issue is that the district court ~: vt.Lt,AI' 
should be held to have the power to issue an assistance order 
in the circumstances presented here. Assuming the district ,,,-------~----------
court's power to issue an order authorizing use of a pen 
\........ register, the need for an assistance order is manifest. Also, 
as discussed in the next section, the burdens and risks on the 
telephone company seem to me to be minimal. In addition, it 
would make little sense to force government agents into using 
the more intrusive wiretap because of a lack of power in the 
district court to issue an assistance order for the less 
intrusive pen register. It will make some new law to find the 
power in §l65l{a), but I think the possible undesirable 
consequences of doing so can be controlled through judicious 
use of the rule that issuance of a §165l{a) order is a matter 
of sound discretion. 
IV. ASSUMING POWER, WAS IT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO 
ISSUE THE ASSISTANCE ORDER? 
The court of appeals majority here took the odd route of 
30. 
assuming §165l(a) power existed, and holding it was an abuse 
of discretion to exercise it. First, the court rejected the 
telephone company's argument that it might be liable to civil 
or criminal liability if it helped install the pen register: 
18 U.S.C. Section 2520, which provides a civil cause of 
action for any individual whose wire or oral 
communication is intercepted in violation of Title III, 
states that "good faith reliance on a court order*** 
shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or 
criminal action brought under this chapter or under any 
other law. [emphasis added] ~-
Petn App. at 9a; accord, Southwestern Bell, supra, 546 F.2d, 
at 246 n.6; see Illinois Bell, supra, 531 F.2d, at 814 
(reaching same conclusion on basis of §605 of Communications 
Act, which excepts from prohibition disclosures of intercepted 
communications made "on demand of other lawful authority"). 
I think the question of liability probably is uppermost 
on the telephone company's mind, despite its professed 
reverence for the privacy of its customers' communications. 
Although it would not be necessary to decide that issue in 
this case, if the Court holds against the company, some 
well-considered dicta on the issue probably would be 
appropriate. I think it is arguable whether §2520 was meant to 
make good faith reliance on a court order issued outside Title 
III procedures a defense, but it might be pressed into service 
for that purpose. 
Having disposed of the threat of liability, CA2 also 
conceded that "law enforcement agents simply cannot implement 
pen register surveillance without the Telephone Company's 
help." Petn App. at 13a. Moreover, it would be very little 
. "' 
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burden on the company to provide the facilities and assistance 
needed, and the district court order required the government 
to pay for the facilities used. Id. at 13a-14a. And it is true 
that law enforcement "may be severely hampered." Id. at 14a. 
To this, CA2 might have added, as the government does, that 
preventing the use of pen registers will force law enforcement 
agents to place greater reliance on wiretaps, with their 
greater intrusion on privacy. 
~~ 
Nonetheless, CA2 found the balance weighted in favor of  
fi~ ng an abuse of discretion. Its basic point was that ~ 
specific congressional aut horization for issuing a pen 
register assistance order should be awaited. This was so for 
three reasons: First, Congress acted quickly to add such 
authorization to Title III after CA9 decided in Application of 
the United States, supra, that district courts did not have 
the power to issue assistance orders for Title III wiretaps. 
This prompt action by Congress must have been due (as resp 
argues on the basic §165l(a) issue) 
to a doubt that the courts possessed inherent power to 
issue such orders, or that courts would be unwilling to 
find or exercise such power, and that in the absence of 
specific Congressional action, other courts would 
similarly reject applications by the Government for 
compelled compliance. 
Petn App. at 15a. The courts in Southwestern Bell and Illinois 
Bell refused to draw this inference from the amendment of 
Title III after Application of the United States, though, and 
I think their position is defensible. It can just as well be 
argued that Congress thought CA9 decided that case wrongly and 
acted to reverse the decision. See 546 F.2d, at 246; 531 F.2d, 
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at 813-14. At worst, the congressional action in amending 
Title III is hopelessly ambiguous as to what Congress thought 
the district courts' powers were in the absence of specific 
authority. In addition, CA2's position is inconsistent; for if 
the amendment of Title III means Congress thought the courts 
did not have §1651(a) power to issue an assistance order, CA2 
should not have assumed that power exists. 
More important to CA2, though, was the slippery slope 
problem: "[W]ithout Congressional authorization, such an order 
could establish a most undesirable, if not dangerous and 
unwise precedent for the authority of federal courts to 
impress unwilling aid on private third parties." Petn App. at 
15a. Congress, better than the courts, can establish 
appropriate safeguards and limitations. To which the dissent 
replied, a §1651(a) order requires both a showing of clear 
necessity and an exercise of sound discretion. "I see no 
reason to assume that the district courts will in the future 
grant law enforcement agencies such relief on anything less 
than a showing of the compelling nature here made, or that, in 
reviewing such orders, future panels of this court will be any 
less sensitive than the present majority to the problems 
involved." Petn App. at 23a. Moreover, judging by Title III as 
amended, Congress is unlikely to draw a blueprint of 
limitations and safeguards of the kind the majority hopes for. 
It seems to me that the majority is saying it cannot 
trust itself to do right in future cases that might come 
along; therefore, it will run the risk of doing wrong in this 
33. 
one. Although this does not ring very true to my ear, there 
is a kernal of sense to what it is getting at. It is the 
problem of at least suggesting limitations on the principle 
that §165l(a) empowers a court to issue orders to third 
parties not before it; or stated more narrowly, that it 
empowers a court to issue orders to third parties to assist 
law enforcement officers. 
One other factor that CA2 might have thrown in the 
balance, but did not, is respondent's argument that a pen 
register is easily converted into a full-blown wiretap; hence, 
it presents a greater threat to privacy than meets the eye. 
Although respondent presses this argument vigorously, I would 
not give it much weight. First, I doubt whether one should 
assume that law enforcement officers will act in blatant 
disregard of a pen register authorization order. Second, 
anyone who does conduct a wiretap without Title III 
authorization, including law enforcement officers, is liable 
for criminal and civil penalties. And finally, as the 
government argues, it appears that if the telephone company 
really is worried, it can take steps to prevent unauthorized 
conversions of pen registers to wiretaps. See Brief for Petr 
at 28 n.34. Although the risk is there, and cannot be 
discounted entirely, I do not think it is great. I would hold 
r-- -




The telephone company is in a strange position in this 
case. Neither of the basic spectors that it raises 
intrusion into customers' privacy, or the possible 
oppressiveness of assistance orders directed to third parties 
really affects it. What it argues for is a bare principle, 
i.e., that courts cannot press unwilling third parties into 
s 
service for law enforctnent officers. While I would oppose 
adopting the converse principle as a general rule, i.e., that 
courts can press unwilling third parties into service for law 
enforcement officers, that is not what the government is 
asking the Court to do. I think that in the narrow 
circumstances of this case, it would be reasonable to hold for 
the government. 
Perhaps the best way to narrow a holding for the 
I government would be to note the similarity between the assistance order here, and one issued under Title III. The 
argument would be that Congress has approved assistance orders 
for wiretaps and it has approved the use of pen registers. It 
plainly would not disapprove the use of an assistance order 
for a pen register, since the nature of the assistance is 
is 





1. At least one commentator shares this view of the "but 
see" cite to Dote. Note, The Legal Constraints Upon the Use 
of the Pen REgister as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60 Cornell L. 
Rev • J O 2 8 , J O 3 5 n • 4 4 ( 19 7 5 ) • 
2. United States v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 546 
F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. pending, No.76-]]57; 
United States v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 53) F.2d 809, 
8]]-8]2 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 
6)0 n.6 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 
478, 482 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); 
United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 2]9, 223 (8th Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Finn, 502 F.2d 938, 942 (7th Cir. 1974); 
Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926, 93] (7th Cir. 1973); 
United States v. King, 335 F.Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 197]), rev'd 
in part on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 4)7 U.S. 920 (1974); United States v. Vega, 52 F.F.D. 
503 (E.D.N.Y. 197]); United STates v. Escandar, 3]9 F.Supp. 
295, 303-304 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. 
United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (en 
bane); but see In the Matter of the Application of the United 
States for an Order Authorizing Use of a Pen REgister DEvice, 
407 F.Supp. 398, 405-408 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Southwestern Bell, 
supra, 546 F.2d, at 249 & n.7 (Lay, J., dissenting); cf. 
United States v. Lanza, 34] F.Supp. 405, 422 (M.D. Fla. 
1972) (pen register used in conjunction with court-ordered 
Title III wiretap). 
3. United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d, at 482; United 
STates v. Brick, 502 F.2d, at 223 & n.]2; United States v. 
Finn, 502 F.2d, at 94)-43 (also construing first clause of 
section 605); Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d, at 93)-932; 
60 Cornell L. Rev., at ]034-)042; but see Southwestern Bell, 
546 F.2d, at 249-25] (Lay, J., dissenting); Application of the 
United States, 407 F.Supp., at 405-406. 
4. In its petition, the government argued, "The executive 
branch of government has inherent power to require the 
assistance of citizens in carrying out its law enforcement 
duties." Petn at ]6. It stated that, "A basic illustration of 
this inherent power is the posse comitatus, in which law 
enforcement officers may require the assistance of members of 
the public in carrying out their duties." Id. at n.]2. The 
government also said, "This duty is not limited to emergency 
situations or to hot pursuit arrests, but applies equally in 
"-- the case of necessary assistance in executing search warrants, 
as Congress recognized in ]8 U.S.C. 3]05." Id. Section 3]05 
provides (emph. added): 
N-2. 
A search warrant may in all cases be served by any 
of the officers mentioned in its direction or by an 
officer authorized by law to serve such warrant, but by 
no other person, except in aid of the officer on his 
requiring it, he being present and acting in its 
execution. 
5. Rule 65(d) provides: "Every order granting an 
injunction and every restraining order ... is binding only 
upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, 
servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in 
active concert or participation with them who receive actual 
notice of the order by personal service or otherwise." 
6. In Field, four convicted criminal defendants failed to 
surrender to serve their sentences. The district court issued 
bench warrants for them, and when they still did not appear it 
declared their bail forfeited. In addition, it ordered the 
trustees of an organization that had posted the bail to appear 
before the court for questioning as to the defendants' 
whereabouts. 
The trustees appeared but refused to answer the 
questions. The district court held them in contempt. On 
appeal, the trustees challenged the district court's 
jurisdiction to order them to appear. CA2 held the district 
court had the power under section 1651 to issue bench warrants 
for the non-appearing defendants ]93 F.2d, at 96, quoting 
Field v. United States, ]93 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1951) (Reed, 
Circuit Justice). It went on to hold that the district court 
also had the power to order the bail fund trustees to appeal 
and answer questions, ]93 F.2d, at 96: 
"Furthermore, it is fundamental that federal 
courts, in common with other courts, have inherent power 
to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the 
administration of justice, within the scope of their 
jurisdiction" Stohbar v. Dwinnell, 5 Cir., 29 F.2d 9]5, 
9]6. See also Adams v. United States ex rel. Mccann, 3]7 
U.S. 269 ..• Here the court was properly continuing the 
effective disposition of the litigation initiated in the 
!criminal 0 case: and examination of those who, as 
developed below, had constituted themselves "in truth, 
the jailers of the fugitives, responsible for their 
appearance," was a natural and approprite step. 
7. "!T 0 he decree entered by the District Court was 
clearly erroneous in so far as it enjoined 'all persons to 
whom notice of the order of injunction should come from taking 
any steps or action of any kind to cause the enforcement of 
the ouster in the state court.' ... It is true that persons 
not technically agents or employees may be specifically 
enjoined from knowingly aiding a defendant in performing a 
prohibited act if their relation is that of associate or 
confederate. Since such persons are legally identified with 
the defendant and privy to his contempt, the provision merely 
makes explicit as to them what the law already implies. 
But by extending the injunction to 'all persons to whom notice 
N-3. 
of the injunction should come,' the District Court assumed to 
make punishable as a contempt the conduct of persons who act 
independently and whose rights have not been adjudged 
according to law." 
; 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATm ---. -
No. 76-835 
' ' United States Court of 
United States Petitioner l On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. Appeals for the Second 
New York Telephone Compa11y. Circuit. 
[October -, 1977] 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question of whether a United States 
District Court may properly direct a telephone company to 
provide federal law enforcement officials the facilities and 
technical assistance necessary for the implementation of its 
order authorizing the use of pen registers 1 to investigate 
offenses which there was probable cause to believe were being 
committed by means of the telephone. 
I 
On March 19, 1976, the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York issued an order authoriz• 
ing agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to 
install and use pen registers with respect to two telephones 
and directing the New York Telephone Company ( the Com .. 
pany) to furnish the FBI "all information, facilities and tech~ 
nical assistance" necessary to employ the pen registers 
unobtrusively. The FBI was ordered to compensate the 
Company at prevailing rates for any assistance which it fur-
nished. App. 6-7. The order was issued on the basis of an 
1 A pt>n register iis a mechanica l device that records the numbers dialed on 
a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulse;; cauised when the dial on 
the telephone is relea:,;ed . It does not overhear oral communications and 
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affidavit submitted by an FBI agent which stated that cer-
tain individuals were conducting an illegal gambling enter-
prise at 220 East 14th Street in New York City and that 
there was probable cause to believe that two telephones bear-
ing different numbers were being used at that address in 
furtherance of the illegal activity. App. 1-5. The District 
Court found that there was probable cause to believe that 
an illegal gambling enterprise using the facilities of interstate 
commerce was being conducted at the East 14th Street address 
in violation of Title 18, United States Code, §§ 371 and 1952, 
and that the two telephones had been, were currently being, 
and would continue to be used in connection with those 
~ order autho,rized the FBI to operate the pen 
registers with respect to the two telephones until knowledge 
.of the numbers dialed led to the identity of the associates and 
confederates of those known to be, according to the FBI 
affidavit, conducting the illegal operation or for 20 days, 
"whichever is earlier." 
The Company declined to ~ comply ~with the court 
order. It did inform the FBI of t e location of the relevant 
"appearances," that is, the places where specific telephone 
lines emerge from the sealed telephone cable. In addition, 
the Company agreed to identify the relevant "pairs," or the 
specific pairs of wires that constituted the circuits of the two 
telephone lines. This information is required to install a 
pen register. The Company, however, refused to lease lines 
to the FBI which were needed to install the pen registers in 
an unobtrusive fashion. Such lines were required by the 
FBI in order to install the pen registers in inconspicuous 
locations away from the building containing the telephones. 
A "leased line" is an unused telephone line which makes an 
"appearance" in the same terminal box as the telephone line· 
in connection with which it is desired to install a pen register. 
If the leased line is connected to the subject telephone liner 
the pen register can then be installed on the leased line at a 
' . 
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remote location and be monitored from that point. The 
Company, instead of providing the leased lines, which it 
conceded that the court's order required it to do, advised the 
FIH to string cables from the "subject apartment" to another 
location where pen registers could be installed. The FBI 
determined after canvassing the neighborhood of the apart-
ment for four days that there was no location where it could 
string its own wires and attach the pen registers without 
alerting the suspects/ in which event, of course, the gambling 
operation would cease to function. App. 15-22. 
On March 30, 1976, the Company moved in the District 
Court to vacate that portion of the pen register order directing 
it to furnish facilities and technical assistance to the FBI in 
connection with the use of the pen registers on the ground 
that such a directive could be issued only in connection with 
a wiretap order conforming to the requirements of Title III 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520 (Title III). It contended that 
neither Fed) Crim. Proc. 41 nor the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1651 (a) , provided any basis f9r such an order. App. 10-14. 
The District Court ruled that pen registers are not governed 
by the prescriptions of Title III because they are not devices 
used to intercept oral communications. It concluded that it 
had jurisdiction to authorize the installation of the pen regis-
ters upon a showing of probable cause and that both the All 
Writs Act and its inherent powers provided jurisdiction for 
its order directing the Company to assist in the installatjon 
of the pen registers. 
On April 9, 1976, after the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals refused the Company's motion to stay the pen 
register order pending appeal, the Company provided the 
leased lines.8 
2 The g:unbling operation was known to employ countersurveillance 
t echniques. App. 21. 
u On the same da te another United States District Court judge extended 
the original order of M~rch 19 for an aclcli tiona.1 20 days. App. 33. 
.. . 
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The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part1 
with one judge dissenting on the ground that the order below 
should have been affirmed in its entirety. Application of the 
United States of America in the Matter of an Order Author·z-
ing the Use of a Pen Register or Similar Mechanical Device 
(Application). 538 F. 2d 956 (CA2 1976). It agreed with 
the District Court that pen registers do not fall within the 
scope of Title III and are not otherwise prohibited or regu-
lated by statute. The Court of Appeals also concluded that 
district courts have the power, either inherently or as a logical 
derivative of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41, to authorize pen reg-
ister surveillance upon an adequate showing of probably cause. 
The majority held, however, that the District Court abused 
its discretion in ordering the Company to assist in the installa-
tion and operation of the pen registers. It assumed, 
arguendo, "that a district court has inherent discretionary 
authority or discretionary power under the All Writs Act to 
compel technical assistance by the Telephone Company," but 
concluded that "in the absence of specific and properly limited 
Congressional action, it was an abuse of discretion for the 
District Court to order the Telephone Company to furnish 
technical assistance." / d., at 961.' The majority expressed 
concern that "such an order could establish a most undesirable, 
if not dangerous and unwise, precedent for the authority of 
federal courts to impress unwilling aid on private third· 
parties" and that "there is no assurance that the court will 
always be able to protect [ third parties] from· excessive or 
1 Thr Court of Appeals recognized that "without [the Company's] trch- 1 
nical aid, the order authorizing the u:;e of a pen regi:;ter will be worthless. 
Federal law enforcement agents simply cannot in:;titute pen register 
surveillance without the TelephonP Company':; help. The a:;:;i:;tauce re-
qupsted requires no extraordi11nry expenditure of time or effort by [the · 
Company]; mdeed, a;; wt- under~tand it, providing lea;;e or private line~; 
is a rehttivrly :;im1_1le rout me proredurr" ld., at 961-962. 
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overzealous Government activity or compulsion." Id., at 
962-963.5 
We granted the United States' petition for certiorari chal-
lenging the Court of Appeals' invalidation of the District 
Court's order against respondent. In this respect we reverse.G 
II 
We first reject respondent's contention, which is renewed 
here, that the District Court lacked authority to order the 
Company to provide assistance because the use of pen regis-
ters may only be authorized in conformity with the procedures 
5 Judge Mansfield dissented in part on the ground that the District Court 
pos!;es;;ed a discretionary power uuder tlw All Writs Act to direct the 
Company to render such assist:ince as was neceS,\;ary to implement its valid 
order authorizing the use of pen registers and that a compelling ca;;e had 
been established for the exercise of discretion in favor of the assistance 
order. He argued that district court judges could be trusted to only 
exercise tlwir powers under the All Writs Act in cases of clear necessity and 
to balance tlw burden imposed upon the party required to render assistance 
against the nece,:sity. 
n Although tlw pen registrr surveillance had been completed by the time 
the Court of Appeals i~sued its deciHion on July 13, 1976, this fact does not 
render the case moot, because the controversy here is one "capable of 
reprtit10n 1 yet evading review." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); Roe\'. Wade, 410 
lf. S. 113, 125 (1973) . Pen register ordrrs is:;ued pursuant to Fed. Huie 
Crim. Proc. 41 authorize i;urveillance only for brief periods. Here, de;;pite 
expedited action by the Court of Appeals, the orrler, as extended, expired 
:;ix dayi; after oral argument. Moreover, even had the pen register order 
heen stayed pending appeal, the mootness problem would have remained, 
beeau~e the showing of probable rause upon which the order authorizing 
the installation of the pen regi:;ters was ba;;ed would almost certainly have 
become stale before review could have been completed. It is also plain, 
given the Company's policy of refw, ing to render voluntary as:,;i::;tance in 
installing pen register::; and the government':; determination to continue to 
utilize tlwm in the future, that the Company will be subjected to similar 
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set forth in Title III 7 for securing judicial authority to inter# 
cept wire communications.8 Both the language of the statute 
and its legislative history establish beyond any doubt that 
pen registers are not governed by Title Ill.° 
Title III is concerned only with orders "authorizing or 
approving the interception of a wire or oral communica-
tion .... " 18 U.S. C. § 2518 (1) 10 (emphasis added). Con-
7 The Court of Appeal::, held that pen register ;;urveillance wa;; subject to 
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. This conclusion i::e not chal-
lenged by either party and we find it unnecessary to com;ider the matter. 
The Government concede;; that it,.: upplirati"n for the pen regi~ter order did 
not. conform to the requirements of Title III. 
b A°Jt .hough this issue i~ not encompa;;sed within the question po;;ed in 
the petition. for certiorari and the Company has not filed a croi::s-petition, 
we have discretion to consider it becau;;e the prevailing party may defend 
a judgment on any ground which the law and the rrcord permit that would 
not expand the relief it ha;; been grunted. Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531, 
538-539 (1931); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475 n . 6 (1970). 
The only relief ;;ought by the Company is that granted by the Court of 
Appeals: the reversal of the District. Court's order directing it to assist in 
the installation. and operation of the pen regi:;ters. The que,;tion of 
whether pen registers are governed by the requirements of Title III was 
considered by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals and fully 
argued here. 
9 Four .Justices reached thi,; conclusion in United States v . Giordano, 
416 U. S. 505, 553-554 (1974) (POWELL, ,J., concurring in part and 
dit=senting in part) . The Court',; 01iinion did not reach the isi::ue ;;ince the-
evidence derived from a pen regi:;ter was ;;uppressed becau:;e this evidence 
wa;; in turn derived from an illegal wire interception. Every Court of 
Appeals that has considered the matter has agreed that pen regi;;ters are 
not within t hl' ;;cope of Title III. See United States v. Illi 11ois Bell Tele-
phone Co., 531 F. 2d 809 (CA7 1976); United States v. Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Co. , 546 F . 2d 243 (CA8 1976); Michigan Bell Telephow, Co. 
v. United States, Dkt. No;;. 76-2202-220:3 (CA6 Oct . 7, 1977); United 
States v . Falcone. 505 F . 2d 478 (CA3 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 955 
(1975); Hodge v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 555 F. 2d 
254 (CA9 1977) ; United States v. Clegg, 509 F . 2d 605, 610 n . 6 (CA5 
1975) . 
10 Similarly, the ,mnction, of Title III are aimed only at one who 
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gress defined "intercept" to mean "the aural acquisition of 
the contents of any wire or oral communication through the 
use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 18 
U. S. C. § 2510 ( 4) (emphasis added). Pen registers do not 
"intercept" because they do not acquire the contents of com-
munications. They do not hear sound or otherwise record 
the content of telephone calls-the communication. They 
disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed-
a means of establishing communication. Neither the content 
of any communication between the caller and the recipient 
of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even 
completed are disclosed by pen registers. Furthermore, pen 
registers do not accomplish the "aural acquisition" of any-
thing. They decode outgoing telephone numbers by respond-
ing to changes in electrical voltage caused by the turning 
of the telephone dial ( or the pressing of buttons on push 
button telephones) and present the information in a form to 
be interpreted by sight rather than by hearing. 11 
The legislative history confirms that there was no con-
gressional intent to subject pen registers to the requirements 
of Title III. The Senate Report explained that the definition 
of "intercept'' was designed to exclude pen registers: 
"Paragraph 4 [of § 2510] defines 'intercept' to include 
the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral 
communication by any electronic, mechanical, or other 
device. Other forms of surveillance are not within the 
proposed legislation. . . . The proposed legislation is not 
designed to prevent the tracing of phone calls. The 
use of a 'pen register,' for example, would be permissible. 
But see United States v. Dote, 371 F. 2d 176 (7th 1966). 
The proposed legislation is intended to protect the 
privacy of the communication itself and not the means of 
'to intercept, any wire or oral communication; 
(1) (a) . 
t 1 See Application, supra, 538 F. 2d, at. 957. 
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communication." S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 
p. 90 (1968).12 
It is clear that Congress did not view pen registers as posing 
a threat to privacy of the same dimension as the interception 
of oral communications and did not intend to impose Title III 
restrictions upon their use. 
III 
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the District 
Court had power to authorize the installation of the pen reg-
isters.13 It is undisputed that the order in this case was 
12 Dote held that § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. 
§ 605, which prohibited the interception and divulgence of "any communi-· 
cation" by wire or radio, included pen registers within the scope of its ban. 
In § 803 of Title III, 82 Stat. 223, Congress amended § 605 by restricting 
it to the interception of "any radio communication." Congress made this 
change because it intended "[t.] he regulation of the interception of wire or 
oral communications in the future to be governed by [Title III]." S. Rep. 
No. 1097, SU,Pra, at 107. Thus it is clear that pen register:- are no longer 
within the scope of § 605. See Korman v. United States, 486 F. 2d 926, 
931-932 (CA7 1973). The reference to Dote in the Senate Report is 
indicative of Congress' intention not to pla.ce restrictions upon their use. 
We find no merit. in the Company's suggestion that the reference to Dote 
is merely an oblique expression of Congress' dei,;ire that telephone com~ 
panies be permitted to use pen registers in the ordinary course of business, 
as Dote allowed, so long as they are not wsed to assii,;t law enforcement. 
Brief 16. The sentences preceding the reference to Dote state un~ 
quivocably that pen registers are not within the scope of Title III. In 
addition, a separate provision of Title III, 18 U. S. C. § 2511 (2) (a) (i), 
specifically excludes all normal telephone company business practices from 
the prohibitions of the Act. Congress clearly intended to disavow Dote-
to the extent that it prohibited the ui,;e of pen regi;,ters by law enforcement 
authorities. 
18 The courts of appeals that have considered the question have agreed 
that pen register orders are authorized by Fed. Huie Crim. Proc. 41 or by 
an inherent power closely akin to it t-0 issue search warrants under 
circumstances conforming to the Fourth Amendment. See Michigan Bell 
Telephone Co., supra; Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., supra; lllinoitt; 
Qel( 'l'ele'f!hone,_ Co., S1J1?1'q,._ · 
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predicated upon a proper finding of probable cause, and no 
claim is made that it was in any way inconsistent with the 
Fourth Amendment. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (b) author-
izes the issuance of a warrant to: 7 
"search for and seize any (1) property that constitutes 
evidence of the commission of a criminal offense; or 
(2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise 
criminally possessed; or (3) property designed or intended 
for use or which is or has been used as the means of com-
mitting a criminal offense." 
This definition is broad enough to encompass a "search" 
designed to ascertain the use which is being made of a tele-
phone suspected of being employed as a means of facilitating 
a criminal venture and the "seizure" of evide11ce which the 
"search" of the telephone produces. Although Rule 41 (h) 
defines property "to include documents, books, papers and 
any other tangible objects," it does not restrict or purport to 
exhaustively enumerate all the items which may be seized 
pursuant to Rule 41.14 Indeed, we recognizrd in K.2,tz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which held that telephone 
conversations were protected by the Fourth Amendment, that 
Rule 41 was not limited to tangible items but was sufficiently 
flexible to include witli1n fts scope electri>nic intrusions author-
ized upon a finding of probable cause. 389 U. S., at 354-356, 
and n. 16.15 See also Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 
329-331 (1966). 
14 Where the definition of a term in Rule 41 (h) was intended to be all 
inclusive, it is introduced by the phrase "to mean" rather than "to include." 
Cf. Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc ., 293 U.S. 121,125 n. 1 (1934). 
15 The question of whether the FBI, in its implementati.on of the 
'District Court':- pen register authorization, complied with all the require-
ments of Rule 41 is not before us. In Katz, the Court stated that the 
notice requirement of Rule 41 (d) is not so inflexible as to require invariably 
that notice be given the person "searched" prior to the commencement of 
the search. 389 U. S., at 355-356, n. 16. Similarly, it is clear to us that 
the requirement of Rule 41 (c) (1) that the warrant command that the 
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Our conclusion that Rule 41 authorizes the use of pen 
registers under ap ro ritae '"circum;,ances "is supported by 
Fe . u e rim. Proc. 57 ( , w ic provides: "If no proce-
dure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may proceed 
in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or 
with any applicable statute." in Although we need not and 
do not decide whether Rule 57 (b) by itself would authorize 
the issuance of pen register orders, it reinforces our conclusion 
that Rule 41 is sufficiently broad to include seizures of intangi-
ble items such as dial impulses recorded by pen registers as 
well as tangible items. 
Finally, we could not hold that the District Court lacked 
any power to authorize the use of pen registers without defy-
ing the congressional judgment that the use of pen regist?-rs 
"be permissible." S. Rep. No. 1097. supra, at 90. Indeed, it 
would be anomalous to permit the recording of conversat:ons 
by means of electronic surveillance while prohibiting the far 
lesser intrusion accomplished by pen registers. Congress 
intended no such result. We are unwilling to impose it in tl-ie 
absence of some showing that the issuance of such orders 
would be inconsistent with Rule 41, which we conclude was 
generally intended to provide a procedure for the issuance of 
search warrants under terms consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment where not otherwise prohibited. Cf. Rule 57 ( b), 
supra. IV 
The Court of Appeals held that even though the District 
Court had ample authority to issue the pen register warrant 
:,;earch br conductrd within 10 day:,; of its is,;uance does not mean that 
the duration of a pen regi:,;ter surveillance may not exceed 10 days. Thus 
the District Court 's order , which authorizrd surveillance for a 20-day 
period, did not conflict with Rule 41. 
rn Sec United States v. Baird, 414 F. 2d 700, 710 (CA2 1969), cert. 
drnied , 396 U. S. 1005 (1970) ; Jackson v. United States, - U. S. App. 
D . C. -, 353 F . 2d 862, 864 (1965) ; United States v. Remolif. 227 F. 
Supp. 420, 423 (Nev. 1964) ; Link v. Wabash Railroad Co .. 370 U.S. 626, 
6:3:l n . 8 ( 1962) (applying the ,rnalogou:,; provision of Fed. Rule Ci\- .. 
Proc. 83) . 
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and even assuming the applicability of the All Writs Act, 
the order compelling the Company to provide technical assist-
ance constituted an abuse of discretion. Since the Court 
of Appeals conceded that a compelling case existed for requir-
ing the assistance of the Company and did not point to any 
fact particular to this case which would warrant a finding of 
abuse of discretion, we interpret its holding as generally 
barring district courts from ordering any party to assist in 
the installation or operation of a pen register. It was 
apparently concerned that susta.ining the District Court's 
order would authorize courts to compel third parties to render 
assistance without limitation regardless of the burden involved 
and pose a severe threat to the autonomy of third parties who 
for whatever reason prefer not to render such assistance. 
Consequently the Court concluded that courts should not 
embark upon such a course without specific legislative author-
ization. We agree that the power of federal courts to impose 
duties upon third parties is not without limits; unreasonable 
b~ de;;~- ri'ot""'be imJ°;'osed"'.""'-we COIJ.Ciude, however, that 
the order issued here against respondent was clearly author-
ized by t~Act" ~ consistent with the intent 
of -4i?n~ ss. 
1 7 
e All Writs Act provides : 
"The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act 
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate 
1 7 The three other Courts of Appeals which have con~ideied the question 
reached a different conclusion than the Second Circuit. The Sixth Circuit 
in United States v. Michigan Bell Telephone Ca. , supra, and the Sevent-h 
Circuit in United States v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co ., supra, held that the 
Act did authorize the is:suancr of orders compelling a telephone company to 
assist in thP use of :surveillancP devices not covered by Title III such as 
pPn register::;. The Eighth Circui t found such authority to be part of the 
inherent power of district court::; and "concomitant of the power to 
authorize pen register surveillance." United States v. Southwestern Belt 
Telephone Co., supra, 546 F . 2d, at 246. 
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in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to 
the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S. C. § 1651 (a). 
The assistance of the Company was required here to imple-
ment ~ pen '";,egister o raer which we have held the District 
Court was empowered to issue by Rule 41. This Court has 
repeatedly recognized the power of a federal court to issue 
such commands under the All Writs Act as may be necessary 
or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the frustration of 
orders it has previously issued in i~iction 
otherwise obtained: "This statute has served since its inclu-
sion, in substance, in the original Judiciary Act as a 'legisla-
tively approved source of procedural instruments designed to 
achieve the rational ends of law.'" Harris v. Nelson, 394 
U. S. 286, 299 (1969), quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 
266, 282 ( 1948). Indeed, " [ u] nless appropriately confined by 
Congress, a federal court may avail itself of all auxiliary writs 
as aids in the performance of its duties, when the use of such 
historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve 
the ends of justice entrusted to it." Adams v. United States 
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942). 
The Court has consistently applied the Act flexibly in con-
formity with these principles. Although § 262 of the Judicial 
Code, the predecessor to § 1651, did not expressly authorize 
courts, as does § 1651, to issue writs "appropriate" to the 
proper exercise of their jurisdiction but only "necessary" writs, 
we held in Adams that these supplemental powers are not 
limited to those situations where it is "necessary" to issue the 
writ or order "in the sense that the court could not otherwise 
physically discharge its duties." Ibid. In Price v. Johnston, 
supra, § 262 supplied the authority for a United States Court 
of Appeals to issue a.n order commanding that a prisoner be 
brought before· the court for the purpose of arguing his own 
appeal. Similarly, in order to avoid frustrating the "very 
purpose" of 28 U. S. C. § 2255, § 1651 furnished the District 
'Court with authority to order that a federal prisoner be pro-
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duced in court for purposes of a hearing. United States v. 
Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 220-222 (1952). The question ill 
Harris v. Nelson, supra, was whether, despite the absence of 
specific statutory authority, the District Court could issue a 
discovery order in connection with a habeas corpus proceeding 
pending before it. Eight Justices agreed that the district 
courts have power to require discovery when essential to 
render a habeas corpus proceeding effective. The Court has 
also held that despite the absence of express statutory author-
ity to do so, the Federal Trade Commission may petition for, 
and a Court of Appeals may issue, pursuant to ~ 1651. an 
order preventing a merger pending hearings before the Federal 
Trade Commission to avoid impairing or frustrating the Court 
of Appeals' appellate jurisdiction. Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Dean Foods Co .. 384 U.S. 597 (1966). 
The power conferred by the Act extends, under appropriate 
circumstances, to persons who though not parties to the 
original action or engag~~}1 wrong doing are in a position 
to frustrate the implemex~~on of a court order or the proper 
administration of justice, Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. 
United States, 273 F. Supp. 1, 6 (ED Mo. 1967), aff'd. 389 
U. S. 579 ( 1968); Board of Education v. York, 429 F. 2d 66 
(CAlO 1970) , cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971), and encom-
passes even those who have not taken any affirma.tive action 
to hinder justice. United States v. Mellie, 196 Fed. 586 
(ND Ill. 1912); Field v. United States, 193 F. 2d 92, 95-96 
(CA2), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 894 (1951).'8 
Turning to the facts of this case, we do not think that the 
Company was a third party so far removed from the under-
lying controversy that its assistance could not be permissibly 
compelled. A United States District Court found that there 
18 See Labette County Commissioners v. Moulton, 112 U. S. 217, 22I 
(18 4) : "it does not follow because the juri,;diction in mandamus [now 
inrluded in § 1651] is ancillary merely that it cannot be exercised over 
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was probable cause to believe that its faciliti~ were being 
em )lo eel to facilitate a criminal enter rise on a continuing 
basis. or e ompany. wit this knowledge, to refuse to 
supply the meager assistance required by the FBI in its efforts 
to put an end to this venture threatened obstruction of an 
investigation which would determine whether the Company's 
facilities were being lawfully used. Moreover. it can ha,rdly be 
contended that the Company, a highly regulated public utility 
with a duty to serve the public,1° had a substantial interest in 
not providing assistance. Certainly the use of pen registers 
is by no means offensive to it. The Company concedes that 
it regularly employs such devices without court order for the 
purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud, and 
pr~venting violations of law.20 It also agreed to supply the 
FBI with all the information required to install its own pen 
registers. Nor was the District Court's order in any way 
burdensome. The order provided that the Company be fully 
reimbursed at prevailing rates, and compliance with it required 
minimal effort on the part of the Company and no disruption 
to its operations. 
Finally, we note, as the Court of Appeals recognized, that 
without the Company's assistance there is no conceivable way 
in which the search authorized by the District Court could 
have been successfully accomplished. The FBI, after an ex-
haustive search was unable to find a location where it could 
install its own p·en registers without tipping off the targets of 
the investigation. The provision of a leased line by the 
Company was essential to the fulfillment of the purpose-to 
learn the identities of those connected with the gambling 
operation-for which the pen register order had been issued.21 
1u See 47 U.S. C. § 201 (a) and New York Public Service Law, Section 91 
(McKinney 1955) . 
20 Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-28, 40. 
~ 1 We are unable to agree with the Company's assertion that "it is 
extra.ordinary t~ xeept citizenis to directly involve them;,;elvrs in the law 
76-835-0PINJON 
UNITED STATES v. NEW YORK TELEPHONE CO. 15 
The order compelling the Company to provide assistance 
was not only consistent with the Act but also with more recent 
congressional actions. As established in Part II, supra, Con-
gress clearly intended to permit the use of pen registers by 
federal law enforcement officials. Without the assistance of 
the Company in circumstances such as those presented here, 
however, these devices simply cannot be effectively employed. 
Moreover, Congress provided in a 1970 amendment to Title 
TII that "fa] n order authorizing the interception of a wire or 
oral communica.tion shall, upon request of the applicant, direct 
that a communication common carrier ... shall furnish the 
applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical 
assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtru-
sively .... " 18 U. S. C. § 2518 ( 4). In light of this direct 
command to federal courts to compel, upon request, any 
assistance necessary to accomplish an electronic interception, 
it would be remarkable if Congress thought it beyond the 
power of the federal courts to exercise, where required, a 
discretionary authority to order telephone companies to assist 
in the installation and operation of pen registers, which accom-
enforcement process." Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. The conviction that private 
citizens have a. duty to provide assistance to law enforcement officials when 
it is required is by no means foreign to our traditions, as the Company 
appaN'ntly believes. See Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N. E. 726, 
727 (1928) (Cardozo, J.) ("Still, as in the days of Edward I, the citizenry 
may be called upon to enforce the justice of the state, not faintly and with 
lagging steps, but honestly and bravely and with whatever implements and 
facilities are convenient and at hand."). See also In re Quarles and Butler, 
158 U. S. 532, 535 ( 1895) ("It is the duty .. . of every citizen, to assist 
in proseruting, and in securing the punishment of, any breach of the 
peace of the United States" ); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 265 n. * 
(1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring); Elrod v. Moss. 278 F. 2d 123, 129 (CA4 
1921) . Cf. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53, 59 (1957) ("The 
[informer's] privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate 
their knowledge of the commi;;sion of crimes to law-enforcement officials 
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plish a far lesser invasion of privacy.22 We are convinced that 
to prohibit the order challenged here would frustrate the 
clear indication by Congress that the pen register is a per-
missible law enforcement tool by enabling a public utility to 
thwart a judicial determination that its use is required to 
22 We reject the Court of Appeals' suggestion that the fact that Congress 
amended Title III to require that communication common carriers provide 
11eecssary assistance in connection with electronic surveillance within the 
scope of Title III reveals a congressional "doubt that the courts possessed 
inherent power to issue such ordrrs" and therefore "it seems reasonable to 
conclude that similar authorization should be required in connection with 
pen register orders . ... " 538 F. 2d, at 962. The amendment was passed 
following the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Application of the United 
States, 427 F. 2d 639 (1970), which held that absent specific statutory 
authority, a United States District Court was without power to compel a 
telephone company to assist in a wiretap conducted pursuant to Title III. 
The court refused to infer such authority in light of Congress' silence in a 
statute which constituted a "comprehensive legislative treatment" of wire-
tapping. Id., at 643. We think that Congress' prompt action in amend-
ing the Act was not an acceptance of the Ninth Circuit's view but "more 
in the nature of an overrnling of that opinion." United States v. Illinois-
Bell Telephone Co., supra, 531 F. 2d, at 813. The meager legislative 
history of the amendment indicates that Congres:; was only providing an 
unequivocal statement of its intent under Title III. Set> 115 Cong. Rec. 
37192 (1969) (Sen. McClellan). We decline to infer from a congres-
sional grant of authority under these circumstances that such authority 
was previously lacking. See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., supra, 384 U. S., at 
608-612; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 47 (1950). 
Moreover, even if Congress' action were viewed as indicating acct>ptance 
of the Ninth Circuit's view that there was no authority for the issuance of 
orders compelling telephone companies to provide assistance in connection 
with wiretaps without, an explicit statutory provision, it would not. follow 
that explicit, congres::;ional authorization was also needed to order telephone 
companies to assist in the installation and operation of pen registers which, 
·unlike wiretaps, are not regulated by a. comprehen~ive st,1tutory scheme .. 
In any event, by amending Title III Congress has now required that at 
the Government.'1:, request tdephone companies be directed to provide, 
assistance in connection with wire interceptions. It is plainly unlikely· 
that Congress intendt>d at the same time to Jenve federal courts without 
n11thority to req_uire assistance in conne.ction with pen register:s. 
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apprehend and successfully prosecute those employing the 
utility's facilities to conduct a criminal venture. The con-
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